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In its recent Akçam v. Turkey judgment, the Second Section of the European Court was again 
called upon to consider the controversial Article 301 in Turkey which criminalises “denigration 
of the Turkish Nation”. The Court unanimously concluded that the law was overbroad and 
vague, resulting in a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention.    
 
The law was previously considered in Dink v. Turkey (see an excellent post by Lourdes), where 
the Second Section had held it was unnecessary to decide the issue of overbreadth. The law has 
been subject to much criticism, in particular relating to its application to persons expressing 
opinions on Ottoman Empire policy towards Armenians in 1915 being genocide.  
 
The applicant in Akçam was a professor of history who had written extensively on the Armenian 
question in Turkey. Following the prosecution of the late editor of the AGOS newspaper Hrant 
Dink under Article 301 for “denigrating Turkishness”, the applicant wrote an article criticising 
this prosecution, and requested, as an act of solidarity, that he also be prosecuted for his similar 
views on the Armenian question.    
 
A criminal complaint was made against the applicant by a member of the public, alleging the 
applicant’s article amounted to “denigration of Turkishness” under Article 301, incitement to 
crime, and incitement to hatred. The public prosecutor initiated an investigation, and concluded 
that there should be no prosecution, as the applicant’s views in the newspaper article were 
protected expression under Article 10 of the European Convention. This non-prosecution 
decision was upheld on appeal. A second complaint was lodged with the public prosecutor, 
which was also rejected.  
 
Notwithstanding the non-prosecution decision, the applicant made an application to the European 
Court claiming that the mere existence of Article 301, and the fear of prosecution such a law 
created, constituted a continuing violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention. The applicant also claimed that the wording of Article 301 was too 
vague, which could result in arbitrary prosecutions.   
 
The first issue for the European Court was whether the applicant could indeed claim to be a 
victim of a violation of Article 10, as no prosecution had been initiated against the applicant. The 
Court reiterated its general principles on standing: an individual cannot complain about a 
national law merely because they consider it to violate the Convention; an applicant must be 
“directly affected” by the law to have victim status.  
 
In this regard, the Court stated that an individual may claim a law violated the Convention, even 
in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if (i) the individual has to modify his 
conduct or risk being prosecuted (citing Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom), or (ii) is a member of 
a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation (citing Johnston v. Ireland).  
 
The Court considered that the applicant belonged to a class of people who risked being directly 
affected by Article 301, given that he was involved in generating content targeted by Article 301, 
namely academic publications concerning the Armenian question. Moreover, the Court referred 
to the application by the Turkish criminal courts of Article 301 to opinions criticising the official 
thesis on the Armenian question, which had forced to applicant to self-censor in order to avoid 
the risk of prosecution. Thus, the Court concluded that there had been an “interference” with the 
applicant’s right to freedom of expression.     
 
The next question for the European Court was whether Article 301 was overbroad or vague, and 
the Court applied its usual test: was the law sufficiently clear to enable individuals to regulate 
their conduct and to reasonably foresee the consequences of their actions (citing Grigoriades v. 
Greece). 
 
Of note, since the time when the applicant had made his application to the European Court, 
Article 301 had been amended by the Turkish legislature. The amendment included the 
replacement of the operative part of the offence from “denigration of Turkishness” to 
“denigration of the Turkish Nation”. Moreover, in order to initiate prosecution under Article 301, 
public prosecutors had to obtain authorisation from the Ministry of Justice. Nonetheless, the 
Court proceeded to examine the new wording of Article 301.  
 
The Court referred to a leading judgment of the Turkish Court of Cassation which had 
interpreted the old Article 301, interpreting the term “Turkishness” as encompassing “the 
Turkish Nation”. Consequently, the European Court held that the amendment did not clarify the 
meaning of “Turkishness”, as the new wording had not removed from its scope opinions 
concerning the Armenian question.  
 
Furthermore, the Court considered that the new prior-authorisation requirement in order to 
initiate prosecutions under Article 301 did not remove the risk of the application of Article 301 
to legitimate expression, as any change in the political will at the Ministry of Justice would open 
the way for arbitrary prosecutions.  
 
The Court concluded that Article 301 was too wide and vague, as the wording did not enable 
individuals to regulate their conduct to foresee the consequences of their acts. The law was 
overbroad as it was applicable to opinions which are offensive, shocking or disturbing; 
expression which is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention.  Thus, the 
interference was not “prescribed by law”, and consequently, there had been a violation of Article 
10. 
 
Comment   
 
Firstly, the significance of the judgment in Akçam is apparent when one considers that (i) the 
Turkish law under consideration had undergone an amendment since the time of the application, 
(ii) there had been no prosecution against the applicant, with a non-prosecution decision being 
issued; and (iii) the applicant had made no challenge to the law in the domestic courts. 
Nonetheless, the European Court considered it legitimate to review the compatibility of the 
amended law with Article 10 of the Convention, and ultimately finding a violation. 
 Secondly, while the judgment Akçam concerned Article 301, the crux of the issue was its 
application to controversial opinions on the Armenian question, in particular surrounding 
Ottoman Empire policy towards Armenians in 1915 being genocide. The Court ultimately 
concluded that Article 301 was overbroad as it was applicable to such opinions, and thus 
prohibited legitimate expression which offends, shocks and disturbs (Lingens v. Austria). 
 
Thirdly, Akçam may represent an important development in Article 10 jurisprudence. It remains 
to be seen whether the reasoning in Akçam will form the basis for future applications being 
granted by the Court where a person self-censors because of fear of prosecution under a domestic 
law. There are many instances of such laws throughout Europe, including vague laws 
criminalising insult, glorification of terrorism, incitement, etc.        
 
Finally, the European Court went to great lengths to justify granting the applicant standing to 
claim a violation under Article 10. It may not be surprising, therefore, should Turkey decide to 
make a request for referral of Akçam to the Grand Chamber, although the unanimity in the 
Chamber may render such a request difficult.     
 
